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Abstract 
 
This paper serves to further investigate factors influencing partisanship in 
Mexican politics with a focus on state spending and drug violence. With state spending, 
this paper builds on prior literature about political effects of federal social spending 
(Handelman 1997, Domínguez and Chappell 2004, Díaz-Cayeros 2009) to propose a 
similar theory regarding state social spending. The proposed panel data model for 
national elections between 2000 and 2012 finds that for diputados elections, a thousand 
peso increase in state spending had a statistically significant influence on party voting – 
boosting PRI candidates (typically incumbents) by 0.66% and hurting both PAN and 
PRD candidates by 0.78% and 1.57% respectively. This paper also proposes an 
alternative theory of state spending whereby the effect comes from a linkage of spending 
and economic performance. With drug violence, this paper studies the importance of the 
Mexican Drug War on the Mexican political environment but finds no consistent party 
impact of instability (modeled with intentional homicide statistics) in national elections 
from 2000 to 2012. This paper delves into potential explanations for this finding 
including different effects by election, distrust of political parties, and the perception of 
little difference between parties. Finally, the paper outlines other responses to instability 
and drug violence to demonstrate approaches taken by Mexican citizens outside of the 
ballot box. These alternative strategies include protesting, lobbying, migration, and the 
rise of private security.  
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Introduction 
 
 In December 1910, General Porfirio Díaz took the oath of office as Constitutional 
President of Mexico for the eighth time.1 His 26-year iron fist rule came to an end in May 
1911 after the Mexican Revolution, but his impact on Mexican politics was felt for 
decades. Although the new Mexican Constitution of 1917 strictly prohibited the re-
election of any candidate, the succeeding National Revolutionary Party, later renamed the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), held power in Mexico uninterruptedly in the 
country for 71 years from 1929 to 2000.2 In contrast with other authoritarian or one-party 
governments, however, the Mexican political landscape has included elections since 
Porfirio Díaz was first elected to the presidency in 1877.3 These national elections, 
however, served a dramatically different role than typical elections. As Howard 
Handelman noted in the late 1990s, the purpose of elections under the PRI “was not to 
determine the winners, normally a forgone conclusion, but rather to offer the public a 
sense of participation in the political process and thereby to legitimize PRI control.”4 This 
view of elections was so ingrained into the Mexican political leadership that even initial 
electoral reforms under the PRI in the 1960s to encourage opposition parties were not 
taken to usher in democracy but rather to stabilize and legitimize the PRI government.5 
 Despite these intentions, however, electoral reforms and increased political 
opposition over the last decades of the 20th century slowly encouraged true democratic 
                                                          
1 Noll, Arthur. “Porfirio Díaz.” The Sewanee Review 14, no. 4 (1906): 436 – 448.  
2 Handelman, Howard. Mexican Politics: The Dynamics of Change. Page 66. 
3 Priego, Natalia. Positivism, Science and ‘The Scientists’ in Porfirian Mexico (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2016). Page 16. 
4 Handelman, Howard. Mexican Politics: The Dynamics of Change. Page 66. 
5 Morris, Stephen. Political Reformism in Mexico. Page 89. 
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competition. In the 1988 national elections, the PRI lost its two-thirds majority in 
Congress, marking the last time such a threshold would be held by any party and setting 
the stage for coalition politics.6 The shift to democracy was demonstrated most 
prominently by the election of President Vincente Fox from the National Action Party 
(PAN) in the 2000 presidential election. This marked the first time the PRI had lost the 
presidency since 1929. In acknowledging Fox’s victory, incumbent PRI President Zedillo 
said, 
 
We have been able to confirm that we now have a mature democracy, with solid 
and trustworthy institutions and, in particular, with a citizenry of great conscience 
and civic responsibility.7 
 
 Since Fox’s election in 2000, Mexico’s political scene has been dominated by 
three parties: the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party 
(PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). In the 2006 presidential 
election, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón won over PRD candidate López Obrador in the 
closest national election in Mexican history.8 In the 2012 presidential election, PRI 
candidate Peña Nieto’s victory signaled a return of the PRI to power.9 Meanwhile, 
control of Congress has similarly swayed between the three parties with none holding a 
majority alone.10 The emergence of campaigns has similarly seen increased interest given 
                                                          
6 Negroponte, Diana. The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global 
Competition. Page 42. 
7 Conway, William. A Gringo Guide to Mexican History. Page 335. 
8 Domínguez et al. Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy. Page 1. 
9 Domínguez et al. Mexico’s Evolving Democracy. Page 1. 
10 Negroponte, Diana. The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global 
Competition. Page 42. 
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their newfound importance. As the old linkages of clientelism and fraud have faded, 
experts have been curious as to the factors that will take their place. 
 Although this field is rich with literature, two developments and potential factors 
have been understudied until this point. First, the role of state spending and second, the 
influence of the Mexican Drug War. With the decline of clientelism, many experts 
wondered about the role of social welfare programs in the new democratic Mexico. 
Would welfare benefits continue to sway voters even without vote buying? As will be 
detailed later, studies have found evidence of party influences from federal social 
spending – but the topic of state social spending has not been studied previously.11 To 
begin the study on this topic, this paper includes state spending per person as a variable 
on party preference in national elections from 2000 through 2012. Further, this paper 
proposes an alternative theory for state spending dependent on a link between higher 
spending and better state economic performance.  
Secondly, since 2006, Mexico has been engaged in a largescale national campaign 
against drug trafficking organizations which have ravaged the country. While tied to 
individual elections, no prior study has attempted to uniformly create a model to see party 
preference results from increases in drug violence (represented in this paper with 
intentional homicide rates). This paper will discuss the effect of the Mexican Drug War 
on the Mexican people from 2000 through 2012 and outline various methods in which it 
                                                          
11 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Chapter 12: Welfare Benefits, Canvassing, and 
Campaign Handouts” in Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy: The 2006 Presidential 
Campaign in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2009. Page 237. 
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could influence party preference and politics including the ballot box, protesting, 
lobbying, migration, and the rise in private security. 
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Literature Review 
 
Since this paper primarily focuses on drug violence and state spending as 
potential motives for partisanship in Mexico, its first helpful to provide an overview of 
other factors affecting Mexican politics. This chapter will overview common 
demographic trends in the 2000, 2006, and 2012 presidential elections to provide context 
for further analysis of Mexican politics. It is assumed that many of these same 
demographic trends seen in presidential elections are applicable to senate and diputados 
elections. One note before delving into the literature, however, is the differing effects of 
even the most general demographic variables across the elections. Instead of tied to a 
party, some of these variables (gender, age, income, education, and region) vary by 
individual candidate and election which presents a complication for the panel data model 
used in this paper to study drug violence and state spending. As Roderic Camp notes, an 
“analysis of traditional demographic variables in Mexican presidential elections reveals 
that traditional demographic variables remain significant, if not consistently so, from one 
election to the other.”12 As seen in voting percentages from exit polls from the 2000, 
2006, and 2012 presidential elections,13 voter groups are prone to change their vote by 
election depending on which of the two parties have the strongest support in that election. 
This voter swing creates a cycle in Mexican elections where one of the parties becomes a 
                                                          
12 Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 Presidential Election and What It Reveals about 
Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481. 
13 See Figure # 1: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2000 
(Percentages), Figure # 2: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2006 
(Percentages), and Figure # 3: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2012 
(Percentages) in the Appendix 
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“distant third” as witnessed in all presidential elections since 2000.14 The grouping of 
elections together in the study of state spending and drug violence later in the paper was 
necessary, however, given the absence of enough data to model elections individually. 
This chapter, however, will first delve into demographic variables and their 
impact on Mexican politics. It will briefly overview the influence of gender, age, income, 
education, and region on presidential elections since 2000. The influence of these 
variables can also be seen in exit polls from the three elections, which have been attached 
in the Appendix of this paper. 
 
Gender 
In elections since 2000, gender preferences have not played a significant role in 
voting at the presidential level. Exit polls from the 2000, 2006, and 2012 presidential 
election showed relatively small differences between male and female voters.15 In 
gubernatorial races in the states of Mexico and Coahuila in 2011, “women and men gave 
PAN, PRD, and PRI candidates equal support.”16 There are signs that gender is becoming 
a more salient political identity, however, as trends have shown that women are making 
up a larger share of voters and the 2012 presidential election saw the first selection of a 
                                                          
14 Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 Presidential Election and What It Reveals about 
Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481. 
15 See Figure # 1: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2000 
(Percentages), Figure # 2: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2006 
(Percentages), and Figure # 3: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2012 
(Percentages) in the Appendix 
16 Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 Presidential Election and What It Reveals about 
Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481. 
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female presidential candidate (Vasquez Mota from the PAN).17 For these reasons, it has 
been proposed that “gender is definitely a variable which deserves far greater attention in 
the future.”18 
 
Age 
Age has often played a significant role in voting preference in elections since 
2000, but not on a consistent party basis. In the 2000 presidential election, PAN 
candidate Fox captured 49% of voters under 30 years old but that level of support waned 
to just 38% and then 23% support for the PAN in the 2006 and 2012 presidential 
elections respectively.19 In the 2000 presidential election the generational divide was 
most evident in voting outcomes with young voters overwhelmingly in favor of Fox 
while voters over 60 years old voted overwhelmingly for the PRI candidate. Given the 
significance of the first opposition candidate to win the presidency and emphasis on 
change and democratization, it is theorized that young voters were especially taken with 
Fox because he represented change from a semi-authoritarian system. The age vote has 
been less prominent in the subsequent 2006 and 2012 presidential elections. While voting 
similarly to the electorate, there was evidence of increased youth support for López 
Obrador in the 2012 presidential election. As evidenced in exit polls, voters under 30 
supported Obrador’s candidacy 7 percentage points higher than the broader electorate. 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See Figure # 1: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2000 
(Percentages), Figure # 2: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2006 
(Percentages), and Figure # 3: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2012 
(Percentages) in the Appendix 
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Recently, focus on this age gap has included discussions on news medium – especially 
since voters indicating social media as their main source of news overwhelmingly 
supported Obrador in 2012 compared with those who indicated television networks who 
voted disproportionally for Peña Nieto.20 
 
Income 
Income has proven to be one of the most influential demographic variables in 
presidential elections. The conservative neoliberal PAN party has traditionally done well 
among higher income groups while the PRI and PRD have traditionally done better 
among lower income groups. This relationship is complicated, however, since the three-
party political environment since 2000 has led to a different distant third place in each 
election.21 The traditional relationship between income and voting, however, is well 
observed in the 2000 and 2006 elections with the highest income group voting for the 
PAN candidate with 65% and 50% support respectively. These same elections saw the 
lowest income groups voting for the PRI candidate with 49% support in 2000 and the 
PRD candidate with 34% in 2006. Political scientists have modeled the relationship and 
found supporting data that “richer states on average tend to support the conservative party 
at higher rates than poorer states.”22 The findings for the 2012 presidential election, 
however, in which higher income groups voted disproportionally for the PRD candidate 
                                                          
20 Domínguez et al. Mexico’s Evolving Democracy. Page 21. 
21 Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 Presidential Election and What It Reveals about 
Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481. 
22 Cortina, Jeronimo et al. “One vote, many Mexicos: Income and vote choice in the 
1994, 2000, and 2006 presidential elections.” Columbia University. March 28, 2008. 
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indicates that “higher income Mexicans were attracted to López Obrador for reasons 
other than his economic proposals, probably because he was perceived as honest and 
representing change.”23 
 
Education 
Education has also proven to be a significant demographic variable, and is also 
directly associated with income. The PRI has traditionally done well among those with 
lower education – capturing this group by 55% in 2000 despite losing the election.24 
Those with higher education have predictably favored the PAN, but in a similar fashion 
to what happened to the highest income group in the 2012 election, these highly educated 
voters swung to the PRD in 2012.25    
 
Region 
Region is also an important factor in Mexican partisanship. Start economic 
differences across the regions of Mexico has helped each to identify more strongly with 
different parties. The wealthier North and Center-West are traditional PAN strongholds, 
and areas where the PRI and PRD have historically performed worse than nationally.26 
The PRI and PRD instead have relied on increased support in the Center and South, with 
                                                          
23 Ibid.  
24 See Figure # 1: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2000 
(Percentages), Figure # 2: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2006 
(Percentages), and Figure # 3: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2012 
(Percentages) in the Appendix 
25 Ibid. 
26 Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 Presidential Election and What It Reveals about 
Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481.  
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the Federal District (part of the Center) votes disproportionately for PRD candidates.27 
These patterns mirror the findings of income on partisanship and make sense given the 
PAN’s policies regarding economic liberalization which have been credited for helping 
the North and Center-West especially. These regional ties are still flexible however, as 
shown in the most recent 2012 presidential election. The PRI candidate Peña Nieto’s 
strong performance in the traditional PAN’s strongholds (North and Center-West) set the 
stage for his victory.28  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sets the stage for understanding partisanship in Mexico with a look at 
traditional demographic variables including gender, age, income, education, and region. 
While results vary by election, there are some general noteworthy trends detailed above 
including the support of the wealthier and more educated for the conservative PAN party. 
The exit polls used primarily to understand these demographic relationships, however, 
are very basic and devoid of drug violence figures and reference to spending in all but the 
2006 presidential election (where only beneficiaries of two federal programs, 
Oportunidades and Seguro Popular, are analyzed). Based on this limited research, authors 
have begun looking at non-traditional variables including the role of media, social media, 
policy issues, and individual candidate attributes.29 This paper hopes to build on this 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Red, Magdelana. “Rocking the Vote in Mexico’s 2012 Presidential Election: Mexico’s 
Popular Music Scene’s Use of Social Media in a Post-Arab Spring Context.” 
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013); Camp, Roderic Ai. “The 2012 
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literature on partisanship in Mexico with an in-depth look at the potential influence of 
drug violence and state spending on partisanship and an expanded view of elections to 
cover all congressional elections (president, senators, and diputados) from the 2000, 
2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Presidential Election and What It Reveals about Mexican Voters.” Journal of Latin 
American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 451 – 481. 
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Data Chapter 
 
Methodology 
Based on the available data, a panel data model with fixed effects for time and 
individual states was chosen to model the influence of drug violence and state spending 
on partisanship in Mexico. The model used is shown below: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 +  𝑥𝑖−1
′ 𝛿 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
This model allows for the regression of all Mexican states across multiple years to 
discern trends and see if an uptick in violence or state spending influenced party-voting. 
Without delving too deep into the variables, in the model: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent 
variable (percentage of the vote), 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 represents independent variables (including 
indicators for drug violence and state spending along with other control variables), 𝑥𝑖−1
′ 𝛿 
represents lagged independent variables (change in violence), 𝜂𝑡 is the time fixed effect 
variable, and 𝛼𝑡 is the individual state fixed effect variable. This model allows for the 
data to be tracked for causality while also controlling for time-specific and any state-
specific trends or other influences not represented elsewhere in the model (𝜂𝑡 and 𝛼𝑡). 
Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term that represents the degree which the model misrepresents the 
results seen in 𝑦𝑖𝑡. 
Interest on the varied effect on both federal and other congressional elections led 
to the creation of three separate models within the same panel data format: (1) party 
percentage of the vote in presidential elections, (2) party percentage of the vote in senate 
elections, and (3) party percentage of the vote in members of Congress (diputados) 
13 
 
elections. Since presidents and senators in Mexico serve six year terms,30 in this model 𝑡 
= 2000, 2006, and 2012. Representatives in the Lower Chamber however serve three 
years,31 so in that model 𝑡 = 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. In all models 𝑖 = 1, 2, …, 
32 represents all 31 states in Mexico32 and the federal district (in alphabetical order with 
Aguascalientes as 1 and Zacatecas as 32). For a full listing of states in alphabetical order 
as used in the model, see Figure 1: States of Mexico in the Appendix. 
 
Difficulties 
Complicating data collection was the reality that the Mexican government has 
only recently begun to collect and report data like other developed nations. Although 
Mexico conducted its first census in 1895, collections were sporadic and only in 1990 
began conducting the “Censo de Población y Vivienda” every five years.33 The census 
itself is further challenging for proper data analysis since the Mexican government only 
started including information on ethnicity and religion in 2015.34 The lack of data on such 
crucial social indicators in Mexico have meant that researchers have turned to private 
polls and data, which was not available for use in this model. The only relevant data from 
                                                          
30 “The Mexican Electoral System.” Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE). Accessed 
November 20, 2016.  
31 Ibid. 
32 “The World Factbook: Mexico.” Central Intelligence Agency. November 10, 2016. 
Accessed November 20, 2016. 
33 “Censos y Conteos de Población y Vivienda.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
34 “Censo de Población y Vivienda 2015.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. 
Accessed November 21, 2016  
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the census that was collected over the period of interest (2000 – 2012) was total 
population and gender. 
Data collection issues were not confined to the census. The primary source for 
statistical information in Mexico is the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(“Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía”, INEGI). The INEGI is an independent 
agency of the Mexican Government, created in 1983 by president Miguel de la Madrid, 
that is dedicated to collecting and reporting statistical information for the country.35 
Given its short life, it isn’t surprising that some of the crucial economic data it collects 
only goes back a decade. Examples of this constraint on the model included 
unemployment, number employed by the state government, and GDP which were all first 
collected and reported in 2003.36 Because this data was therefore not available for this 
analysis in a third of data collection years for presidential and senate election models, 
they were discarded in the statistical analysis and could not be incorporated into the 
model. 
Further difficulties arose from the desire for backward projections on important 
economic factors such as GDP. While hoping to include these in the model, I was unable 
to find any backward projections on the Mexican economy at the state-level. The World 
Bank and other economists did provide backward estimates of the GDP for Mexico as a 
whole,37 but since there were no reliable state-level projections the model was forced to 
                                                          
35 “Acerca del INEGI: Institución con historia.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía. Accessed November 20, 2016. 
36 The citation for all three of these data points specifically within INEGI are found later 
when defined in the “Variables” section of the Chapter. 
37 “GDP (current US$): Mexico.” The World Bank. Accessed November 21, 2016. 
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rely even further on time and state fixed effect variables (𝜂𝑡 and 𝛼𝑡) to prevent distortions 
in the model. 
 
Variables 
As discussed earlier, the data was organized into a panel data model on the basis 
of state and year. In the model, ID represents the listing of states from 1 to 32 (including 
the federal district). Year is represented as the year of the election for that data (elections 
since 2000). 
The dependent variable (𝑦𝑖𝑡) varies by regression but ultimately is either Turnout 
(measured by total voters compared with total registered voters) or PRI, PAN, or PRD 
(percentage of total voting population that voted for the PRI, PAN, or PRD). 
The independent variables (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖−1
′ 𝛿) included Turnout (total votes out of 
total registered voters), Homicides (international homicide figures reported by the INEGI 
for the year of the election to approximate drug violence), Homicides2 (percentage 
increase in drug violence since the last election), PopGrowth (population growth since 
the last election and the year before election), Spending (gross state expenditures per 
person in the year of election), Male (percentage of the population that was male), N1, 
N2… (𝜂𝑡) (time fixed effect variable), and A1, A2, …, A31 (𝛼𝑡) (individual state fixed 
effect variable). 
 
Findings: 
The STATA regression outputs are presented below in three different models for 
presidential, senate, and member of Congress (diputados) elections. While the focus of 
16 
 
this paper will be the influence of drug violence (represented with Homicides and 
Homicides2) and level of state spending (represented with Spending), the model also 
found other interesting connections in Mexican politics worthy of commentary and 
further investigation. Primarily, this model confirms prior literature on the role of gender 
in politics and finds no significant and consistent role of gender across different elections 
(except perhaps for males voting for PRI candidates in congressional diputados 
elections). Further, the model found a curious relationship between population growth 
and partisanship. In both Presidential and Senate elections, it was indicated that 
population growth was helping PAN and hurting PRD candidates. In Diputados elections, 
however, this influence was nonexistent and instead population growth was found to have 
a large negative influence on PRI candidates. Given that none of these findings had p-
values less than 0.01, however, the displayed relationship is dubious and in need of 
further in-depth investigation to determine whether these findings hold. The model also 
hinted at a relationship between rising instability (shown with Homicides2) and turnout 
with a negative impact on turnout in diputados elections by 6.8%. Since this finding was 
not consistent across different elections and only had a p-value less than 0.05 however, 
the finding is still unreliable and the exact relationship between drug violence and turnout 
requires more research.  
The model also predictably found a relationship between presidential election 
years and turnout with diputados elections in presidential years showing improved 
turnout by 64.2%. Further, there may be some effect from presidential coattails as 
diputados elections in presidential years also saw significant effects on voting percentage 
for both PRD and PRI candidates. Specifically, presidential election years were found to 
17 
 
boost PRD voting percentage by 6.7% and hurt the PRI voting percentage by 4.8%. This 
finding is hardly surprising. Between 2000 and 2012, the PRI was ousted from power at 
the federal level and the party’s horrible reputation at the national level would drag down 
local candidates during presidential election years. Over this same time period, the PRD 
identity was increasingly reliant on its presidential nominee – Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 
(candidate in 1994 and 2000) and López Obrador (candidate in 2006 and 2012). For 
proof of this, look no further than López Obrador’s separation from the PRD after his loss 
in the 2012 presidential election. Their identity had been so tied to him that in recent 
polls for the 2018 presidential election the PRD candidate is running at only 6% 
compared with their former nominee who is running second at 25% under his own new 
political party MORENA.38 Although the findings provide further evidence for the 
importance of coattails in Mexican politics, the topic is already well-researched and 
outside the purview of this paper.39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 “Encuesta: Zavala encabeza las preferencias.” El Universal. July 11, 2016. 
39 The fascination with Mexican coattails began as early as 1979 and many observations 
have been made about the influence of certain candidates on others. If interested, good 
examples of such literature include: Segovia, Rafael. “Las elecciones federales de 1979.” 
Foro International 20, no. 3 (1979): 397 – 410; Dominguez, Jorge. “Chapter 22: 
Mexico’s Campaigns and the Benchmark Elections of 2000 and 2006.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Mexican Politics, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 523 – 544. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 2012; Magar, Eric. “Gubernatorial Coattails and Mexican 
Congressional Elections Since 1979.” Journal of Politics 74, no. 2 (2012): 383 – 399; and 
Cantú, Francisco and Scott Desposato. “The New Federalism of Mexico’s Party System.” 
Journal of Politics in Latin America 4, no. 2 (2012): 3 – 38. 
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Presidential Elections Model 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRI PAN PRD Turnout 
     
Turnout 0.00115 -0.00322 -0.0956  
 
 
(0.0765) (0.0788) (0.0651)  
Homicides 1.92e-06 -3.47e-06 -4.17e-07 1.46e-05 
 
 
(1.71e-05) (1.76e-05) (1.45e-05) (2.97e-05) 
Homicides2 -0.00141 -0.00117 0.00699 -0.00752 
 
 
(0.00590) (0.00609) (0.00503) (0.0103) 
PopGrowth 0.0941 0.467** -0.591*** 0.330 
 
 
(0.220) (0.226) (0.187) (0.381) 
Spending 0.000313 0.000483 -0.00228 -0.00377 
 
 
(0.00532) (0.00548) (0.00453) (0.00928) 
Male 0.317 0.0412 -0.150 0.0334 
 
 
(0.312) (0.322) (0.266) (0.546) 
Constant 0.164 0.198 0.379*** 0.250 
 (0.161) (0.166) (0.137) (0.280) 
     
Observations 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.734 0.751 0.851 0.504 
Number of ID 32 32 32 32 
     Note: Each model also includes dummy variables for each state (save one), coefficients not reported. The table reports Huber-  
    White standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Senate Elections Model 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRI PAN PRD Turnout 
     
Turnout -0.0617 0.0418 -0.115  
 
 
(0.0751) (0.0739) (0.0716)  
Homicides -1.21e-05 -9.95e-06 1.05e-05 1.23e-05 
 
 
(1.65e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.58e-05) (2.94e-05) 
Homicides2 0.00281 -0.00407 0.00535 -0.00824 
 
 
(0.00573) (0.00564) (0.00546) (0.0101) 
PopGrowth 0.0153 0.487** -0.556*** 0.329 
 
 
(0.213) (0.210) (0.203) (0.376) 
Spending 0.00403 0.00918* -0.00833* -0.00132 
 
 
(0.00515) (0.00507) (0.00491) (0.00916) 
Male 0.253 0.0370 -0.168 0.0257 
 
 
(0.303) (0.298) (0.289) (0.539) 
Constant 0.158 0.0879 0.427*** 0.229 
 (0.156) (0.154) (0.149) (0.276) 
     
Observations 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.544 0.594 0.694 0.567 
Number of ID 32 32 32 32 
    Note: Each model also includes dummy variables for each state (save one), coefficients not reported. The table reports Huber-  
    White standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Member of Congress (Diputados) Elections 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRI PAN PRD Turnout 
     
Turnout -0.0164 0.0311 0.0214  
 
 
(0.0280) (0.0255) (0.0264)  
President -0.0483** 0.00945 0.0674*** 0.642*** 
 
 
(0.0217) (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.0429) 
Homicides -1.58e-05 -2.13e-05 6.82e-06 4.65e-05 
 
 
(1.38e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.34e-05) (4.63e-05) 
Homicides2 -0.00982 0.0113 0.00440 -0.0681** 
 
 
(0.00911) (0.00884) (0.00914) (0.0310) 
PopGrowth -1.243** 0.787 -0.0469 0.253 
 
 
(0.510) (0.494) (0.511) (1.768) 
Spending 0.00657** -0.00781*** -0.0157*** -0.00583 
 
 
(0.00251) (0.00244) (0.00252) (0.00870) 
Male 10.24*** -6.855* -5.442 -9.627 
 
 
(3.887) (3.769) (3.895) (13.45) 
Constant -4.670** 3.715** 2.988 4.653 
 (1.891) (1.835) (1.896) (6.548) 
     
Observations 151 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.403 0.423 0.517 0.817 
Number of ID 32 32 32 32 
    Note: Each model also includes dummy variables for each state (save one), coefficients not reported. The table reports Huber-  
    White standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is noted with the conventional *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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State Spending 
 
 In Mexican politics, social or welfare spending has been proven to have a 
significant relationship on voting habits. The political ramifications of social spending 
first arose after radical increases in federal social expenditures since the 1960s. Social 
spending grew from 19% of federal expenditures under President López Mateos (1958 – 
1964) to 59% of federal expenditures under President Fox (2000 – 2006).40 Given the 
210% increase in federal social or welfare spending, political scientists were curious as to 
the political effects. In an analysis of the 2006 presidential election, Alberto Díaz-
Cayeros et al. found that welfare recipients were more likely to have voted for PAN 
candidate Felipe Calderón.41 The finding was somewhat unexpected since it was the PRD 
candidate López Obrador who was the most outspoken candidate in favor of increased 
social spending.42 Instead, the finding suggested that increased welfare voting led 
recipients to vote for the incumbent party. Those receiving help from social spending 
under President Fox (PAN) ended up voicing approval for increased social spending by 
voting for the PAN candidate in the next election. 
 Building on this prior research, this paper chose to include gross state 
expenditures in the model to see if state spending similarly influenced political outcomes. 
Although not having a consistent relationship on presidential or senate elections, 
                                                          
40 Camp, Roderic Ai. Politics in Mexico. New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. Page 
303.  
41 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Chapter 12: Welfare Benefits, Canvassing, and 
Campaign Handouts” in Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy: The 2006 Presidential 
Campaign in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2009.  
42 Ibid. 
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individual state spending was found to have a significant impact on voting percentages 
for the PRI, PAN, and PRD in local Diputados elections. Specifically, a thousand peso 
increase in spending per person was found to boost PRI candidates by 0.66% while 
proving to have a negative impact on both PAN and PRD candidates by 0.78% and 
1.57% respectively. This chapter explores state spending, explains these findings, and 
finally proposes an alternative economic theory for the displayed relationship. 
 
Exploring State Spending  
 
Unfortunately, due to the highly-centralized nature of Mexican politics and only 
recent emergence of federalism, the topic of state spending has been considerably less 
studied than federal spending.43 To analyze the relationship between state spending and 
political outcomes, however, one must first make some assumptions about state spending. 
Based on literature on federal spending trends in Mexico and limited individual state 
budgets, one can deduce that state spending in Mexico has become increasingly social in 
nature and is focused primarily on education and welfare.  
 The recent rise of social expenditures in Mexico has been a well-documented 
phenomenon. The focus on so-called social development spending has been a largely 
unified effort from the three major parties. The two most prominent social programs that 
have been credited with massive reach and political impacts are Oportunidades and 
Seguro Popular.  
                                                          
43 Beer, Caroline and Roderic Ai Camp. “Invigorating Federalism: The Emergence of 
Governors and State Legislatures as Powerbrokers and Policy Innovators.” Oxford 
Handbook of Mexican Politics. 2012. 
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The first of these programs, Oportunidades (originally entitled Progresa), was 
established in 1997 consisted of three complementary elements: 
(1) a cash transfer, intended primarily for food consumption; (2) a scholarship, to 
cover the opportunity cost of children’s labor so they could stay in school; and (3) 
nutritional supplements44 
 
Originally rolled out in rural areas, Oportunidades was expanded to urban areas and by 
1999 reached approximately 2.6 million families and 40% of rural households.45 
Oportunidades was expanded further under PAN president Fox and by 2005 coverage had 
almost doubled to 5 million families.46 This type of conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program has proven extremely effective at targeting the poor and promoting both short-
term and long-term benefits.47  
The second program, Seguro Popular, was introduced by the Fox administration 
in 2002 to provide health coverage to the uninsured in Mexico. By 2005 the program had 
been implemented in all 31 states and covered almost 3 million families.48 Unlike 
Oportunidades, Seguro Popular spending is controlled by the state and therefore 
“coverage and spending still vary widely among states.”49 While these are the two most 
recent and relevant programs for analyzing electoral effects, detailing the percentage of 
total federal expenditures by category reinforces this trend towards social spending.  
                                                          
44 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Chapter 12: Welfare Benefits, Canvassing, and 
Campaign Handouts” in Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy: The 2006 Presidential 
Campaign in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2009. Page 231. 
45 Ibid. Page 231. 
46 Ibid. Page 231. 
47 Ibid. Page 232. 
48 Ibid. Page 232. 
49 Ibid. Page 232. 
24 
 
The Evolution of Federal Social Expenditures50 
Presidential               Expenditure Category (Percent of Total) 
Administration     Economic   Social   Administrative   
Calderón 2006 - 2011  33  57  10   
Fox 2000 - 2006  31  59  10   
Zedillo 1994 - 2000  32  56  12   
Salinas 1988 - 1994  33  50  17   
De la Madrid 1982 - 1988  39  41  20   
López Portillo 1976 - 1982  41  33  26   
Echeverria 1970 - 1976  62  29  9   
Diaz Ordaz 1964 - 1970  55  32  13   
López Mateos 1958 - 1964  39  19  42   
Ruiz Cortines 1952 - 1958  53  14  33   
Alemán 1946 - 1952   52   13   35   
Source: Este País, (December 1999), 16; México, Presidencia de la Republica, Quinto informe de 
gobierno, anexo estadístico, September 1, 2011, 127 – 128.  
 
 
While similar category breakdowns are not made available on a per-state basis, a 
look at the Nuevo Léon budget for 2016 is helpful to provide an estimate for how state 
funds are used. In 2016, a full 72% of state spending in Nuevo Léon was dedicated to 
social development programs (“desarrollo social”).51 Breaking down that spending 
further, the 2016 state budget stated that a full 53.4% of that social spending was on 
education while the next largest category was social welfare programs (“protección 
social”) at 10.7%.52 Secondly, an analysis of total state expenditures has shown a 
significant increase in spending since 2000. On average, state spending from 2000 to 
2012 had increased 265.9% with outliers being Baja California (grew by 68.3%) and 
                                                          
50 Taken from Camp, Roderic Ai. Politics in Mexico. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2014. Page 302. 
51 “Presupuesto Ciudadano 2016.” Nuevo León: Gobierno del Estado. Secretaria de 
Finanzas.  
52 Ibid.  
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Yucatán (grew by 604.9%).53 This is not surprising given federal trends with social 
spending and also the expectation for states to cover some welfare program spending 
including about half of Seguro Popular spending.54 These findings line up with the 
literature on federal social expenditures and provide the basis for the assumption that 
state spending has similarly seen a rise in social and welfare expenditures.    
 
Political Impact 
 
 The idea that government spending influences voting is a relatively old concept 
and even provides the basis for pork barrel spending (politicians would seek additional 
funding for projects in their district and would in return improve their chance at 
reelection). Polling has produced informal proof of this relationship in the United States 
with Democrats twice as likely as Republicans to have received food stamps.55 Further, 
academic literature has shown that voters will punish the government for cutting back 
welfare state entitlements. Conventional literature on welfare state reform even includes 
political risk as a key assumption (see: Huber and Stephens 2001, Pierson 2001, Starke 
2006).56 While until very recently reelection was not a component of Mexican 
                                                          
53 See Figure 5: Gross State Expenditures (Percentage Growth since Last Election) in the 
Appendix. 
54 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Chapter 12: Welfare Benefits, Canvassing, and 
Campaign Handouts” in Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy: The 2006 Presidential 
Campaign in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2009. Page 233. 
55 Schumacher, Gijs et al. “Political Parties’ Welfare Image, Electoral Punishment and 
Welfare State Retrenchment.” Presented at the NIG Work Conference 2009.  
56 Huber, E. and J.D. Stephens. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and 
Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2001.; Pierson, P. 
The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001.; Starke, P. 
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democracy, the idea of using social spending in exchange for party allegiance is a similar 
concept.  
 In 1988, after his narrow and fraudulent election, President Carlos Salinas (1988 – 
1994) introduced a “massive public words and welfare program, called the National 
Solidarity Program (PRONASOL).”57 Although of definite value to the poor in Mexico, 
one of the purported goals of the program was to “rearticulate state-society links [and] 
recover lost legitimacy…”58 The strategy proved effective and has been partially credited 
with the strengthening of the PRI’s vote in the subsequent 1991 and 1994 national 
elections.59 This trend was so troubling to Mexican politicians that subsequent electoral 
reforms called for the prohibition of government social welfare program advertisements 
during campaigns.60 These restrictions were largely ignored, however, and President 
Zedillo (1994 – 2000) implemented his own social welfare program entitled PROGRESA 
which consisted of conditional cash transfers to combat poverty.61 Although the creation 
of the programs themselves was not counterproductive to democracy, concerns were 
raised from the marketing of them as PRI programs and the message of PRI operatives 
who told beneficiaries “We’ve helped you; now you help us!”62 
                                                          
“The Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Literature Review.” Social Policy & 
Administration 40, no. 1 (2006): 104 – 120. 
57 Handelman, Howard. Mexican Politics: The Dynamics of Change. Page 72. 
58 Morris, Stephen. Political Reformism in Contemporary Mexico. Page 91 – 92.  
59 Handelman, Howard. Mexican Politics: The Dynamics of Change. Page 72.  
60 La Botz, Dan. Democracy in Mexico: Peasant Rebellion and Political Reform. Page 
200. 
61 Domínguez, Jorge and Chappell Lawson. Mexico’s Pivotal Democratic Election: 
Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000. Page 48 – 49. 
62 Ibid. 
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The collapse of the one-party system in Mexico was supposed to have eroded 
these informal PRI links, but the implication of social spending has remained a concern 
in the Mexican political landscape.63 During the 2006 presidential election, the PAN 
government under Fox was the target of similar accusations of manipulating social 
welfare programs during the campaign season. One influential nongovernment poll-
watching organization warned for months “that the PAN was using federal social 
programs to buy votes.”64 Despite these accusations, however, independent analysis has 
largely found that while “Oportunidades and Seguro Popular made the PAN’s election in 
2006 possible… voters acted out of their own free choice.”65 Even without direct 
manipulation of votes, however, Alberto Diaz-Caveros et al. found that beneficiaries of 
Oportunidades and Seguro Popular were more likely to vote for the PAN candidate 
Calderón by 11% and 7% respectively.66 Although vote buying through social programs 
had ended, it seemed as though social spending was still having a significant political 
impact. This data provides evidence for the theory of increased support for incumbent 
political parties among social spending beneficiaries with the same political scientists 
concluding:  
The PAN’s claiming credit for social policy benefits, we believe, is what 
propelled poor people receiving help from Oportunidades and Seguro Popular to 
support that party. Beneficiaries of these social programs were significantly more 
                                                          
63 Domínguez, Jorge and Chappell Lawson. Mexico’s Pivotal Democratic Election: 
Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 2004. Page 56 – 60. 
64 Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Chapter 12: Welfare Benefits, Canvassing, and 
Campaign Handouts” in Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy: The 2006 Presidential 
Campaign in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2009. Page 237. 
65 Ibid. Page 238. 
66 Ibid. Page 239. 
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satisfied with their personal finances and with the way the president was handling 
the economy than were similarly poor individuals who did not receive these 
welfare benefits.67 
 
 The increased support of social spending recipients for the incumbent political 
party is a concept that be expanded to understand the relationship between state spending 
and support for the PRI party. Although the PRI lost the presidency in 2000 and the PAN 
held power at the federal level over the duration of this model (from 2000 to 2012), the 
PRI remained the prominent political force at the state and local level.68 Just as an 
increase in social spending at the federal level led to increased support for the incumbent 
party in presidential elections, it is possible that increased social spending at the state 
level led to increased support for the incumbent state-level party (PRI) in diputados 
elections. This would help explain why the model found that a thousand peso increase in 
spending per person at the state level was found to boost PRI candidates by 0.66% and 
hurt both PAN and PRD candidates by 0.78% and 1.57% respectively. The association of 
state spending with diputados elections rather than senate or presidential elections would 
also be understandable under this theory whereby presidents and senators were judged 
with federal outcomes more in mind – while diputados were instead believed to be more 
local representatives. The true beneficiaries of this relationship, however, would be 
governors and state legislatures.  
                                                          
67 Ibid. Page 244. 
68 Langston, Joy. “Chapter 7: The Dinosaur that Evolved: Changes to the PRI’s 
Gubernatorial Candidate Section, 1980 to 2009.” IN The Oxford University Handbook on 
Mexican Politics, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 143 – 166. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2012.  
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 Supporting this theory are stories of PRI governors during the 1990s moving 
around state funds to help shore up support for the PRI. These were traditionally 
understood as examples of vote buying but rest on the same underlying assumption that 
state spending can influence voting patterns. In the run up to the 2000 elections, PRI 
Governor Manuel Barlett (1993 – 1999) passed a law to divert spending from “cities 
controlled by the National Action Party (PAN) to rural areas where it was easier for the 
PRI to harvest votes.”69 In Yucatán, PRI Governor Víctor Cervera Pacheco (1993 – 2001) 
did similar by distributing massive amounts of new resources under federal antipoverty 
programs.70 
Repeating this paper’s same model with respect to state spending level and more 
local elections would be interesting to test the proposed theory. Unfortunately, however, 
the INE does not provide comprehensive election results for state elections making this 
type of data collection much more difficult. In addition to conducting more research with 
local elections, it would also be helpful to conduct a study by which states were 
differentiated based on the ruling local party (indicated by either governor or state 
legislature) to test whether increased state spending benefits the incumbent party instead 
of just the PRI party since this model was unable to differentiate between the two.     
 
Economic Performance 
 
 Instead of increased social spending leading to increased citizen loyalty to the 
incumbent party at the state level, an alternative theory relies on state spending as a proxy 
                                                          
69 Domínguez, Jorge and Chappell Lawson. Mexico’s Pivotal Democratic Election: 
Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000. Page 48. 
70 Ibid. 
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for economic performance. Interpreting increased state spending as an indication of a 
better state economy means that the discovered relationship is reflective of voters 
showing a higher tendency to vote for the incumbent party based on positive economic 
outcomes. To explain this theory, this section will first establish the link between 
economics and voting preference and then discuss the way spending and economics may 
be linked. 
 Political theorists have largely popularized the hypothesis that positive economic 
conditions are a boon to the incumbent party and a detriment to other contesting parties.71 
Academic research has largely affirmed this theory. Pundits used this type of language to 
associate Obama’s election in 2008 with a worsening economy and his reelection in 2012 
as a result of an improved economy.72 Famed statistician Nate Silver includes economic 
performance in his election prediction models and specifically wrote that “the historical 
evidence is robust enough to say that economic performance almost certainly matters at 
least somewhat.”73  
 In Mexico, the influence of economic performance on elections actually dates 
back to the 71-year long hegemonic rule of the PRI. It has been argued that relatively 
positive economic performance was a factor that convinced Mexican citizens to 
                                                          
71 Erikson, Robert. “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote.” The American 
Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 567 – 573.  
72 Fisher, Patrick. “Economic performance and presidential vote for Obama: the 
underappreciated influence of race.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 4, no. 1 (2016): 30 – 
46.  
73 Silver, Nate. “Measuring the Effect of the Economy on Elections.” FiveThirtyEight. 
July 5, 2012.  
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acquiesce with the semi-authoritarian regime and keep the PRI in power.74 There is an 
abundance of literature supporting this theory, finding that authoritarian regimes are less 
likely to survive with poor economic performance (see: Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 
Przeworski and Limongi 1997, and Geddes 1999).75 Economic performance in Mexico 
has continued to play a role in voter choices even after the so-called rise of democracy 
with Fox’s election in 2000. An analysis of the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections has 
revealed that a voter’s assessment of the country’s economic circumstances was one of 
three variables that largely explained the distribution of voter preferences (alongside 
partisanship and an assessment of the incumbent president’s performance).76  
 The abundance of literature on economic political impacts therefore spawns the 
theory that the relationship between state spending and voting preference is just a proxy 
for the relationship between economics and voting preference. For this to be true, 
however, state spending and economic performance must be linked. The exercise 
therefore becomes a question of whether state spending and economic performance are 
linked. This section will detail the two potential arguments in this regard: either state 
                                                          
74 Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto et al. “Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Hegemony and 
Democratization in Mexico.” SSRN. April 2003. 
75 Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. The Political Economy of Democratic 
Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1995); Przeworski, Adam and 
Fernando Limongi. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” World Politics 49, no. 2 
(1997): 155 – 183; Geddes, Barbara. “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a 
Game Theoretic Argument.” Prepared for meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. September 1999. 
76 Dominguez, Jorge. “Chapter 22: Mexico’s Campaigns and the Benchmark Elections of 
2000 and 2006.” In The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 523 
– 544. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. 
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spending has a positive relationship on economic performance or economic performance 
has a positive relationship on state spending. 
 Fortunately, there is plenty of literature on the topic of whether more state 
spending leads to better economic outcomes. Unfortunately, however, the topic is still 
hotly contested. Proponents point back to John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 book The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money which posited that the government 
can act to stabilize the business cycle largely with spending.77 The theory was developed 
into the classic IS-LM macroeconomic model which was the dominant framework of 
economic analysis until the mid-1970s and is still taught in macroeconomic courses 
across the world.78 In this IS-LM mathematical model, government spending is directly 
related with a country’s GDP. The Keynesian model and its assumptions on government 
spending, however, have come under heavy fire especially since the 1970s. Economists 
of different schools of thought have commented on the crowding-out nature of 
government spending and proposed instead the possibility that government spending can 
in fact harm an economy.79 The debate rages to this day with evidence and studies on 
both sides. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 – popularly known as 
Obama’s stimulus plan – was a recent example of the continued controversial role of 
                                                          
77 Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New 
York: Polygraphic Company of America. 1935. 
78 Colander, David. “The Strange Persistence of the IS-LM Model.” History of Political 
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79 Alesina, Alberto et al. “Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment.” NBER Working Paper 
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government spending in economic performance. Proponents argued the spending would 
jump-start the economy while conservatives warned more government spending would 
not improve the economy and instead would slow the recovery. Even today, the results 
are contested with prominent economists on both sides.80 
 The other viewpoint from which economic performance and state spending may 
be connected, with state spending increasing as an economy does well, is less 
academically explored. The assumption would hold that as an economy improves so do 
tax revenues meaning state spending would increase accordingly. While the logic seems 
sound, the relationship is complicated by specific tax mechanisms and fears of inflation 
during times of high growth. Ultimately, neither hypothesis concretely explains the 
relationship between state spending and economic performance. Yet, the first theory in 
which social spending is related with increased incumbent party support makes a more 
convincing argument. Further studies including better control variables for economic 
performance (state GDP) may also be helpful as it could reveal that it is economics, not 
individual state spending, that is driving the apparent relationship between spending and 
voting for the PRI (interpreted as the incumbent state party). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Given that the relationship between state spending and economic performance 
remains a point of contention, the interplay between voting preferences and state 
spending is more likely to be a result of rewarding incumbent political parties for 
                                                          
80 Matthew, Dylan. “Did the stimulus work? A Review of the none best studies on the 
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increased social or welfare spending. Like the relationship between federal social 
spending and incumbent party voting, individual state spending has also proven to have a 
positive impact in Diputados elections on PRI candidates (the incumbent governing party 
in most states from 2000 to 2012).81 It would be interesting to repeat this study 
specifically relating individual state spending to voting outcomes for the incumbent 
governing party (which party held the governorship) and with the incumbent party of past 
Diputados. This would help to prove whether the relationship between individual state 
spending and PRI candidates reflects voting for the governor’s political party or the 
incumbent party of the Diputados – or whether contrary to the interpretations of this 
chapter, that individual state spending is directly tied to increased support for the PRI 
rather than the incumbent party. 
 The relationship between spending and partisanship, combining both the theory 
on state spending in this chapter and the effects of federal spending in other literature, 
present an interesting perspective for Mexican politicians. Not only does it strengthen the 
incentives for increased social spending but it also adds a dimension of worry with 
budget cuts. Recently, for example, the Mexican government announced plans to cut 
spending by $10 billion in 2017 amid worries of poor economic growth.82 The move may 
                                                          
81 As of March 2017, the PRI only held 15 of 32 governorships in Mexico (still more than 
any other party) but historically (from 2000 to 2012 when this model takes place) they 
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further damage the ruling PRI in upcoming national elections which has already been 
suffering as President Peña Nieto (PRI) had a record low 12% approval rating as of 
January 2017.83 If states too cut their spending, especially on critical social welfare 
programs, incumbent parties by state may see political ramifications. 
 It would be remiss not to mention the literature in opposition to the proposed 
theory. Although prior literature and this model have found results that reinforce the idea 
that voters distinguish between political parties and reward good behavior with increased 
loyalty, the presence of this voting behavior itself has been questioned. In “Electoral 
Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico,” Matthew 
Cleary explored this same theory in Mexico only to conclude that the quality of 
government is dependent on an engaged citizenry and cooperation rather than the threat 
of electoral punishment.84 Under this contradictory theory, the Mexican public would not 
recognize a relationship between political party and governance meaning that the ballot 
box would be an inefficient mode to voice concerns or choose leadership.85 Although the 
influence of federal social welfare programs has widespread evidence and this paper’s 
model finds significance from state spending, other political scientists continue to dispute 
that this relationship exists.86 Studies around the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential 
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elections in the United States, for example, found that “voters’ perception of their 
dependence on federal spending are unrelated to vote choice in the three presidential 
elections, with the exception of senior citizens who benefit from federal spending, who 
were more likely to vote Democratic in 2012 than seniors who did not benefit.”87 Even 
with specific attention to Mexico, there is contention on whether welfare recipients vote 
differently. In Matthew Singer’s book The Electoral Politics of Vulnerability and the 
Incentives to Cast an Economic Vote, he states that “we found no evidence that welfare 
recipients were more likely to vote for the PAN or any other party.”88 It is unclear 
whether this statement is also meant to say he found no evidence of welfare recipients 
voting in greater percentage for the incumbent party, but his writing indicates this is the 
case as he largely casts aside the role of welfare spending on ballot box decisions.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 Lacy, Dean. “Moochers and Makers in the Voting Booth: Who Benefits from Federal 
Spending, and How Did They Vote in the 2004 Through 2012 Presidential Elections?” 
Presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (August 2014) 
and the American Association for Public Opinion Research (October 2014). 
88 Singer, Matthew. The Electoral Politics of Vulnerability and the Incentives to Cast and 
Economic Vote. Written as doctoral dissertation at Duke University. ProQuest & 
Learning Company (2008). Page 380. 
89 Ibid. 
37 
 
Responses to Violence 
 
When faced with declining or unstable government, citizens engage in various 
activities to voice dissatisfaction and survive. There is therefore no denying that the rise 
in drug violence and instability in Mexico has altered the political landscape and 
relationship between the people and the state. Despite this logic, however, statistical 
analysis from the model used in this paper was unable to find a significant consistent 
relationship between intentional homicide and party voting in Mexico since 2000.90 
However, the availability and seemingly common use of responses apart from voting 
(including: protests, lobbying, migration, and private security) reinforces the reality of a 
large impact of drug violence on the population and could also potentially help to explain 
the lack of significance as Mexican citizens are turning to these strategies instead of using 
their power in the ballot box. This would hold with other findings that Mexicans are 
typically very politically engaged except when it comes to voting.91 The reluctance of 
voters to use parties as an avenue to express dissatisfaction may well be linked to a 
distrust of political parties and the failure of parties to present different strategies to 
combat violence.  The lack of significance between violence and party voting may also 
be related to an evolving democratic system whereby the “fear vote” has not consistently 
helped a single party over multiple elections or may be indicative of a system of voting 
for individuals over parties. Since this model uses data from all elections between 2000 
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and 2012, it would be unable to detect influences that help different parties in different 
elections. 
While additional studies and polls would be needed to confirm this theory, this 
chapter will present this argument by first explaining the history and impact of drug 
violence in Mexico. Secondly, this chapter will explore voting with regards to violence in 
order to present features of Mexican politics that have plausibly prevented consistent and 
widespread use of the ballot box to voice dissatisfaction over the rise in drug violence. 
Finally, this chapter will outline various other responses to violence in Mexico including 
protests, lobbying, migration, and the rise of private security. 
 
The Mexican Drug War 
 
“As I have said, today organized crime poses the greatest threat to Mexicans’ 
safety, freedom and tranquility. It is an enemy that knows no limits, that severely 
damages society as a whole and jeopardizes peace, security and our institutions” 
        
      – President Felipe Calderón. June 28, 2010.92 
 
Despite the long history of drug trafficking in Mexico, it was only in the mid-
1980s that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations rose to prominence and came into 
conflict with the Mexican government – setting up decades of fighting. As John Baily 
points out in his article on “Drug-Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent 
Democracy,” 1985 marked a “tipping from a stable equilibrium of corruption and 
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collusion to one of violent confrontation among the DTOs [Drug-Trafficking 
Organizations] and between these and the state.”93 Reasons for this tipping point and 
escalation through the 21st century are numerous and debated but it has been tied most 
prominently to the crackdown on major rival Colombian cartels, the emergence of 
competitive democratic politics in Mexico, the arrest of key cartel leaders, and an 
increasing ease to smuggle drugs across the border following the tripling of trade volume 
between Mexico and the United States after the signing of NAFTA.94  
Whatever the reason, by October 2007 it was noted in a Congressional Research 
Service Report for the U.S. Congress that Mexican drug cartels “now dominate the 
wholesale illicit drug market in the United States”95 and the violence had spread to target 
“civil society and higher-ranking politicians and government officials.”96 Under both 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994 – 2000) and President Vincente Fox (2000 – 2006), 
troops were committed to both prevent the flow of drugs through Mexico and to destroy 
the production of drugs in Mexico. However, violence in the country escalated in 
December 2006 with the full entrance of the Mexican armed forces into the so-called 
“Mexican Drug War.” On December 11, 2006 the newly elected President Felipe 
Calderón sent 4,000 Mexican Army soldiers to Michoacán to end drug violence there.97 
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The Michoacán operation remains active to this day and the only somewhat reliable death 
figures come from six years ago in 2010 when it was reported that over 500 people had 
been killed including 50 soldiers and 100 police officers.98 In his first speech as president, 
Calderón said, “today criminality is trying to terrorize and immobilize [our] society and 
government” and he promised to “fight to re-take public security.”99 Between 2007-08, 
he followed through on this promise and seven more large-scale joint operations were 
launched in Baja California, Guerrero, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, 
and Sinaloa.100 
The overall death toll from drug and gang-related violence has been staggering. A 
2015 Congressional Research Service report estimated that at least 80,000 people had 
been killed because of organized crime related activities since 2006.101 An accurate death 
count however is understandably difficult and the subject of much debate. The Mexican 
press has mostly agreed with the CRS figure, with Zeta (newspaper based in Tijuana) 
publishing the figure at 83,191 over the course of President Calderón’s presidency (2006 
– 2012).102 U.S. press agencies have put forward a lower estimate over the same time 
with the number of deaths between 40,000 and 60,000. The Trans-Border Institute at the 
University of San Diego, however, estimated between 120,000 and 125,000 drug-related 
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deaths during the Calderón administration.103 The difficulties of obtaining accurate drug 
violence figures are well explained in a PBS article from July 2015: 
To be sure, the homicides documented in Mexico cannot all be linked directly to 
the drug war, and distinguishing drug-war violence from the raw totals can be 
fraught with challenges. Many murders are never investigated, and the Mexican 
government has not issued annual figures on organized-crime-style homicides — 
those believed to be the work of cartels — since 2010. Even when it did, such 
data was often knocked for being untrustworthy. Some counts have blamed the 
drug war for as much as 55 percent of all homicides. Others have put the estimate 
as low as 34 percent. Yet those figures have likewise been criticized. For 
example, someone killed by a high-caliber or automatic firearm would be counted 
as a victim of organized crime, but if they were strangled or stabbed to death, they 
would not necessarily be considered a casualty of the drug war.”104 
 
As a result of these difficulties, many prominent reports on the drug war have 
used “intentional homicides” as reported by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Geografia (INEGI). While not all of these homicides are related to drug trafficking, there 
is ample evidence that drug violence has been responsible for the drastic increase in 
intentional homicides especially since 2007. Media organizations in Mexico (most 
prominently the newspapers Reforma and Milenio) have compiled independent tallies that 
indicate “at least a quarter and as many as half of all intentional homicides in 2015 bore 
characteristics typical of organized-crime related killings, including the use of high-
caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages.”105 Further, 
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while the calculation is not perfect, intentional homicides are well documented and a 
good indication of instability in general.  
Using intentional homicide figures from INEGI, one can see the clear increase in 
violence in the country. Between 2000 and 2015, intentional homicides increased by 
104.75%.106 This figure even factors in the decrease in violence seen since the election of 
President Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012. If only looking at 2000 through 2011, intentional 
homicides increased by 155.18%.107  
 108 
  Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) 
 
To make that more relatable, over the seven-year period between 2007 and 2014, 
about 103,000 civilians died in Afghanistan and Iraq combined from both homicide and 
war casualties. 109 During this same period, roughly 113,112 people were murdered in the 
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United States.110 In Mexico, according to data reported by the Mexican government for 
this time frame, over 164,000 civilians were the victims of homicide.111  
    112    
     Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI), the United Nations, FBI, and the website “Iraq Body Count.” 
 
While informative, the absolute number of homicides per country serves to hide 
the size of the country. Accordingly, the United Nations reports an “intentional homicides 
per 100,000” figure to more accurately compare different countries. Even when looking 
at the data in this manner however, Mexico stands out. 
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113 
  Global Study on Homicide 2013. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
 
 
When looking at the figures by state in Mexico, the situation looks even worse. 
Intentional homicides actually rose by over 250% in 8 Mexican States (Baja California 
Sur, Colima, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nuevo León, Tabasco, and Tamaulipas).114 
To further exemplify the effect of the drug trafficking organizations on safety in Mexico, 
one need look no further than Nuevo León where intentional homicides rose by 1,872% 
between 2000 and 2011.115 
Worse still is the fact that murder is only part of the story. To fully understand the 
atrocities and instability caused by the rise of the drug trafficking organizations and the 
Mexican Drug War, one must also consider widespread kidnapping, armed robbery, 
intimidation, extortion, and sexual assault. In just the six years between 2006 and 2012, the 
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Mexican attorney general had compiled a list of more than 25,000 adults and children that 
had gone missing.116 
While all of this is concerning, it is also important to note that Mexico’s crime 
problem extends beyond its overall homicide rate. As John Baily noted in 2010, the “crime 
problem with respect to Narco-trafficking has two main dimensions: acute violence and 
systemic infiltration.”117 Indeed, although Mexico has seen a drastic increase in violence 
since 2006, Mexico’s homicide rate in 2015 – at about 13 per 100,000 inhabitants – still 
ranked towards the middle of Latin America with a rate higher than Chile (3), Peru (7), 
Nicaragua (8), and Costa Rica (11) but still lower than Colombia (25), Brazil (26), 
Honduras (57), Venezuela (90) and El Salvador (103).118 Despite the relatively average 
national homicide rates for Mexico when compared with the rest of Latin America, it is 
this systemic infiltration and widespread nature of corruption that have contributed to a 
high level of instability and distrust from the Mexican public. 
In an indication of continued level of instability (even after the relative decline in 
violence since its peak in 2011), the U.S. State Department had active travel warnings on 
21 (out of 32) Mexican states as of December 8, 2016.119 Of these warnings, the strongest 
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were in relation to five states (Mexico, Jalisco, Michoacán, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas) 
where the U.S. State Department urges American citizens to defer all non-essential 
travel.120 
Despite varying regional intensity, the impact of the increase in drug violence is 
felt throughout the entire country and reflected in the attitudes of the Mexican people. Since 
homicide rates had consistently dropped even under the Zedillo (1994 – 2000) and Fox 
(2000 – 2006) administrations, security was “not the leading preoccupation for most 
Mexicans [prior to 2006].”121 In August 2006, only 35% listed a security issue as their top 
concern but by 2012, this figure rose to 50%.122 This rising concern for security in the face 
of increased drug violence is seen in polling across Mexico. In a Pew Foundation survey 
from 2009, 81% of respondents said that crime is a “very big” problem.123 The same survey 
found that 42% of Mexicans reported they were the victim of a crime in 2008 (second 
highest rate in Latin America after Venezuela).124 Another poll from 2009 in Mexico found 
that when asked about threats to Mexican national security, 84% of respondents’ answers 
directly related to components of drug trafficking violence (47% organized crime, 15% 
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public insecurity, 8% kidnapping, 7% corruption, and 7% armed groups).125 Confirming 
this theory, when asked to name the “greatest threat to their country from abroad, 53 
percent listed drug trafficking, followed by 21 percent indicating arms trafficking.”126 
Although these polling figures are most relevant to the time frame of the model (2000 – 
2012), its worthy to note that the election of PRI president Peña Nieto in 2012 has not 
improved the situation. Polling in 2015 found that 69% disapproved of Peña Nieto’s 
handling of corruption and 63% disapproved of his handling of fighting crime and drug 
traffickers.127 Crime, drug-related violence, and corruption also remain top national 
concerns with all three being mentioned by over 70% of respondents as “big problems.”128 
Further, the public’s perception of the police has actually gotten worse with attitudes 
towards the military starting to erode and confidence in the police falling from 35% in 2009 
to a record low of 27% in the 2015 survey.129 All of this polling emphasizes the influence 
that the Mexican Drug War and increased violence has had and continues to have on 
Mexicans’ safety and perception of their country. 
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Party Preference 
In Joy Langston’s article analyzing citizens’ political options before the collapse 
of the PRI’s “one-party hegemonic regime,” she posited, 
In 2000, however, the Mexican party system was far more developed than it had 
been in 1988 or earlier. Stable party options, such as the PRD and the PAN, now 
offered a democratic alternative to voters…130 
 
The emergence of different political parties and democratization of the country 
guided the hypothesis that political party voting would be a prominent avenue through 
which the Mexican public would voice dissatisfaction related to the Mexican Drug War. 
Based on this hypothesis, percentage of votes for the major three political parties were 
included in models for presidential, senate, and members of parliament (diputados) 
elections in the hope of providing evidence of party-shifts in line with rising drug 
violence and instability. Contrary to this hypothesis however the resulting model found 
that neither intentional homicides nor a lagged  
intentional homicide variable were statistically significant on party vote across elections 
for the president, senators, or members of parliament (diputados) since 2000.131 
While unexpected, this finding showing no statistically significant relationship is 
still useful to discuss the Mexican political party system and perceived legitimacy of 
democracy in Mexico. While the finding shows no link between drug violence and party-
preference, one should be careful not to overstate the implication as it is very possible 
Mexicans are still using the ballot box in response to drug violence – simply not in a 
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consistent basis based on party since 2000. This section will outline various aspects of 
Mexican politics that could help to explain the model’s finding. The section will begin 
with an exploration of Mexican political participation and then outline potential 
explanations for this lack of a concrete relationship including struggles of an evolving 
democratic system, voting for individuals over parties, no clear party differences on 
strategies to counter the rise in drug violence, and multidimensional voting. 
 The first step to understanding the link between drug violence and politics is 
knowing that individual tend to specialize in specific modes of political participation 
(Verba et al. 1971, 1978; Verba and Nie 1972).132 According to the International Social 
Survey Programme’s 2004 survey on citizenship, it was found that 
Mexican participation rates exceed the Latin American average in terms of 
individual contacting of politicians or civil servants, contacting the media to 
express one’s views, and in the share of the population that has donated money or 
raised funds for a social or political activity. Mexican rates of attendance at 
political meetings and rallies exceeded those of long-established democracies. 
However, in the most conventional forms of participation… Mexicans take part at 
considerably lower rates than citizens of long-established democracies.133 
 
With this in mind, it was noted that electoral participation is another matter. In Joseph 
Klesner’s article on Mexican voter participation, he noted that “Of 11 Latin American 
countries that held elections between November 2005 and December 2006, the average 
turnout rate was 72.1 percent. Mexico’s turnout rate in its July 2006 presidential election 
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was only 58.6 percent.”134 Based on both these observations, Klesner concludes that 
“Mexican participation rates (except for voting) are healthy.”135 This observation of 
participation trends in Mexico helps to reinforce the theory that Mexicans are voicing 
dissatisfaction with drug violence and instability with means other than voting. Later in 
the chapter, a few of these other strategies including protests, lobbying, migration, and a 
turn to private security will be discussed.  
 The evolving and relative young democratic system in Mexico is another reason 
why instability and drug violence were not found to have a consistent and significant 
influence on party selection in Mexico. Despite the fall of the semi-authoritarian PRI 
from power and emergence of a relatively stable three-party system, the Mexican people 
still struggle with perceived legitimacy of elections. These fears are built upon a long 
history of show elections under the PRI before 2000 and the blatantly fraudulent election 
in 1988 especially. To this day, fears over fair elections persist and were well 
demonstrated in the 2006 presidential election when López Obrador refused to concede 
the election, called for an investigation of the results, and declared himself the “legitimate 
president of Mexico.”136 While Mexico has attempted to combat this legitimacy gap with 
independent election bodies (see: INE), the problem persists. As noted in 2011, “only 49 
percent of Mexicans believed that the victorious candidate in the most recent election 
really received the majority of votes!”137 This is linked to a general distrust of political 
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parties and an associated dissatisfaction with democracy. Mexican political parties rank 
among the least trusted institutions in Mexico with only 31% of respondents in 2009 
indicating either “some” or “much” confidence.138 For context, the only two institutions 
surveyed that were trusted less than political parties were the police (29% confidence) 
and Congress (28% confidence).139 In the 2003 ENCUP (La Encuesta Nacional sobre 
Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas) survey, membership to political parties was 
ranked among the lowest of political engagement with only 16 percent of respondents 
reporting to be members.140 This finding is reinforced by a poll on reasons for Mexican 
voters casting ballots for president in 2000, in which only 5% of voters named “party 
loyalty.”141 Mexicans still do associate themselves with political parties and each has a 
so-called “base” but recent political fluidity has led to a rise of nonpartisan voters and the 
capturing of other party loyalists. For example, in the 2006 presidential election, the PRI 
received 31% of the PAN’s proposed 27% base of so-called party loyalists.142 This same 
dissatisfaction with political parties is reflected in Mexicans’ attitudes towards 
democracy in general. According to Latinobarometer data, the proportion of Mexican 
citizens who are “somewhat” or “very” satisfied with democracy dropped from a high of 
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45 percent in 1997 to around 17 percent between 2003 and 2005.143 In David Crow’s 
article on the subject of Mexican dissatisfaction with democracy, he specifically notes 
that “disenchantment leads to lower voter turnout, less civic engagement, and more legal 
and illegal protest.”144 These legitimacy struggles around politics in Mexico may help to 
explain why voters are not using political parties to the extent of the original hypothesis 
behind the model. If dissatisfied with democracy and generally distrustful of political 
parties, voters may be turning to protest and other strategies to deal with rising instability. 
 Another possible explanation for the lack of significance between drug violence 
and partisanship is the tendency to vote for individuals over parties leading to an 
inconsistent “fear vote” presented in the model. If drug violence helped different parties 
in the 2000, 2006, and 2012 elections, they would largely cancel out and not show up in 
the proposed panel data model. In accordance with this theory, there is evidence both that 
Mexicans vote for individuals over party and that the so-called “fear vote” helped 
candidates from different parties in different elections. The tendency to vote for 
individuals over parties is evident in many democracies and similarly in the public 
polling. In the 2000 presidential election, when asked to explain the reason for their vote, 
the highest response was 22% indicating “his proposals” followed by 9% indicating “the 
candidate.”145 These responses stand in comparison to the response of only 5% of voters 
who indicated “party loyalty” in the same survey.146 López Obrador’s decision to leave 
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the PRD and form his own party reinforces this trend of voting for individuals over 
parties. Following Obrador’s loss in the 2012 presidential election, he resigned from the 
PRD and formed his own political party named MORENA.147 In recent preliminary polls 
for the 2018 presidential election, Obrador is running second with 25% of the vote with 
MORENA while the PRD’s candidate is polling at only 6%.148 The predicted collapse of 
the PRD voting percentage and radical rise of MORENA based purely on their candidate 
reinforces this reality that voting in Mexico is largely based on individual candidates as 
opposed to political parties. This explanation would hold that Mexicans do in fact use the 
ballot box to voice dissatisfaction with drug violence but in a more nuanced manner than 
simply voting out the incumbent party and instead related to perceptions around 
individual candidates.  
Incorporated into this explanation of the voting with respect to violence is the lack 
of a clear difference in strategy between parties to counter the rise in drug violence. In 
Mexico there is no grand interparty debate on anti-drug trafficking strategy. In the first 
presidential debate for the 2012 presidential election, there was no mention of the 
military budget and also no major debate between candidates outlining different paths 
forward to combat violence.149 Although public statements do not reflect a big difference 
between PRI, PAN, and PRD approaches to drug violence, there is a more informal 
assumption among the Mexican public that the PRI would approach drug traffickers 
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differently. This thought holds that the PRI is more likely to negotiate with drug 
traffickers and therefore decrease violence – similar to how the PRI operated prior to 
losing the presidency in 2000. Emblematic of this perception, in 2011 President Calderón 
was quoted by the New York Times as saying the PRI negotiated with drug traffickers – 
setting off a political controversy in the 2012 presidential election.150 When asked to 
clarify, however, the president’s office “denied that Calderón had told the newspaper that 
the PRI would make deals with the cartels should it win the election.”151 Academic 
research has actually found evidence for this thought, with Melissa Dell finding a 
statistically significant relationship between close election of PAN mayors and increases 
in drug-related violence.152 Evidence of this perception on voting in the 2012 presidential 
election seems to be abundant from news articles. Upon Peña Nieto’s victory, many 
newspapers discussed his promise to “bring peace and prosperity back to a country weary 
of drug violence…”153 while after his victory articles outlined his pending choice 
between an “aggressive fight or a more compromising approach towards the cartels.”154 
The hypothesis behind this model expected a positive relationship between drug violence 
and PRI candidates based on this perception. The lack of a significant linkage between a 
political party and violence in this model, however, indicates that either the Mexican 
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public votes primarily on individual candidates and not this perceived party distinction or 
that the public did not vote on this perception until the 2012 presidential election. The 
answer to this question would be more easily established if drug violence were more 
widely included in Mexican surveys on elections.155 
 The last proposed explanation for the lack of a relationship between political 
parties and voting in the model is simply based on the nature of voting. Voting is 
inherently multidimensional whereby various factors are weighed against each other on 
an individual basis to determine which candidate or party someone will support. While 
violence is one factor, it is very possible that citizens in Mexico largely vote based on 
other factors. Simply looking at voting percentage results without actual exit polls or a 
large panel data set makes it very difficult to properly discern the exact weight and 
relationship between violence and partisanship. This section outlined possible 
explanations to why the Mexican public has either not used the ballot box in response to 
rising instability or why the impact on party voting has not been consistent. Further 
research and polling would be required to determine which of these theories (and it could 
be more than one) holds true. Apart from voting, there are a host of other forms of 
political participation that the Mexican public could use in response to drug violence. The 
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following sections will outline a couple examples including protests, lobbying, migration, 
and the rise in private security. 
 
Protests and Lobbying 
For the sake of simplicity, this thesis treats lobbying and protesting almost 
indistinguishably using the uniform definition of “expressing disapproval and attempting 
to influence or sway a public official towards a desired income.” While there were many 
smaller protests against the governments’ response to drug violence – including a “die-in 
protest”156 among doctors in Ciudad Juárez in 2010 – the largest protest movement in 
regards to The Mexican Drug War began in May 2011.157 
In March 2011, Mexican poet and activist Javier Sicilia’s 24-year-old son was 
captured, tortured, and shot by members of a drug cartel.158 Despite condolences from 
President Calderón, Sicilia felt these were empty words and organized a protest of over 
200,000 Mexicans who marched to the capital on May 8, 2011 to pressure the 
government for peace.159 This protest marked the beginning of the Mexican Indignados 
Movement (or in Spanish: Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad). The 
movement called for ending the war with specific focus on drug legalization, ending the 
governments’ militarized approach to crime, punishing corruption, giving more visibility 
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to victims of violence, and addressing the social and economic causes of organized 
crime.160 In August of the same year, Sicilia and other movement leaders were in talks 
with government officials to modify a national security law that would have given 
broader powers to the Army and police in the war.161 Although almost unanimously 
approved in the Chamber of Deputies on August 2, 2011, pressure from the protestors led 
lawmakers to approve an amended version with added language and restrictions to 
promote human rights and civil liberties.162 In recognition of his role in sparking protests 
to voice dissatisfaction with the war, TIME magazine even named Javier Sicilia as a 
person connected with “The Protestor” as person of the year in 2011.163 
The movement has grown and continues to this day with international support and 
attention. In 2012, Scalia traveled and visited 27 different U.S. cities in his so-called 
“Caravan for Peace” calling for the end of the War on Drugs.164 More recently, following 
the disappearance of 43 students in September 2014, a national #YaMeCansé (roughly 
translates to “I’m tired”) campaign rose to prominence calling for an end of the Mexican 
Drug War.165 The message was adjusted slightly by different users with examples 
including “Enough, I’m tired of living in a narco state” and “Enough, I’m tired of corrupt 
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politicians.”166 In December 2014, the unrest led to protests across Mexico and 43 
different U.S. cities (with their own adapted hashtag #USTired2) demanding justice, 
especially in light of the fact that Mexican police officers had arrested and delivered the 
43 students to a local drug cartel – who later admitted to killing them.167 In addition to 
protests, there have been different organizations attempting to influence politics 
surrounding drug violence. The most prominent example of which has been 
Transparencia Mexicana, which has been lobbying politicians to reveal their assets in an 
effort to fight corruption which they see as “the origin of all the country’s ills”.168 
 
Migration 
In polling data from the Pew Research Center in 2009, 33% of respondents 
(Mexican citizens) reported that they would move to the U.S. if they had the means and 
opportunity.169 When asked further about the reasons why they would move, 81% cited 
dissatisfaction at crime in Mexico while another 73% cited dissatisfaction with illegal 
drugs and 68% said corrupt political leaders.170 This is reflected in academic literature as 
well, where the relatively high crime rate and instability from drug-related violence have 
been cited as common so-called push factors for immigration from Mexico. In a report 
from 2010, Wood et. al. reported quantitative evidence  for this theory by finding a 
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statistically significant relationship between crime victimization and interest in 
emigrating to the United States from Latin America.171 Specifically, those who reported 
they or a family member had been the victim of a crime in the past year were 30% more 
likely to be considering migration.172 A host of news articles have also commented on 
this rationale behind immigration with titles including “Fleeing Drug Violence, Mexicans 
Pour Into U.S.” (New York Times, 2010), “Want To Reduce Illegal Immigration? End 
The Drug War.” (Huffington Post, 2015), “Refugees From Mexico Drug War Flee to US” 
(The Nation, 2009), and many others.173  
In addition to news articles and stories from immigrants, another area which 
demonstrates the tendency to flee violence can be tracked with asylum requests from 
Mexico to the United States. Unfortunately for many of these asylum seekers, fear of a 
crime is not enough to qualify for asylum (“well-founded fear or persecution if sent back 
to their home country” is required); but the numbers do indicate a class of immigrants 
due to instability. However, the number of asylum requests is increasing. In 2009, 338 
Mexicans passed an “initial credible fear review” by an asylum officer but just four years 
later in 2014, 2,612 Mexicans passed this initial review.174 Despite the prospect of fleeing 
Mexico for safety, asylum has not been a fruitful path, as exemplified by the fact that 
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despite hearing 9,317 asylum requests from Mexico between 2007 and 2010, only 183 
were granted.175 
In 2014, the United States witnessed a high profile example of this type of 
immigration as it saw a surge of young children on its southern border. CNN described 
the it as a refugee crisis caused by “drug cartels… driving vulnerable populations 
northward to the United States.”176 This situation raises another factor of drug violence 
that prompts migration – the search for economic opportunity. As Caitlin Dickson in a 
report for the Daily Beast noted in 2014: 
 
… by making these countries so dangerous and virtually unlivable for its poorest 
citizens, the cartels have effectively created an incentive for people to flee, 
thereby providing themselves with more clientele for their human smuggling 
business.177 
 
Accurately measuring migration flows from Mexico is difficult as there is no 
official count on the part of the Mexican government. Further, there is no large data set 
recording migrants’ rationale behind their movements. That said, there are smaller reports 
that have done just that with regards to just immigration between Mexico and the United 
States. Outside of immigration patterns with the United States, however, the topic is 
severely lacking data. 
With regard to immigration patterns with the United States, the data available 
seems to undermine the strength of drug violence as a motive for Mexicans fleeing the 
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country. According to data from the Mexican National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 
(ENAID) and the U.S. Census, more Mexicans have left the United States than entered in 
recent years. Specifically, between 2009 and 2014, there was a net loss (for the U.S.) of 
140,000 Mexican immigrants.178 There was also a smaller net loss of 20,000 Mexican 
immigrants between 2005 and 2010.179 This stands in contrast to the net gain of over 2.2 
million immigrants between 1995 and 2000, and also questions the role of violence in 
immigration patterns. Evident in the contracting net immigration trends with the push 
factors of drug violence is the complicated nature of immigration – which includes 
motives from instability to economics and family reunification. Despite these macro-
patterns, however, it is important to note that leaving Mexico is a prominent strategy for 
many displaced and threatened by drug violence. In a 2012 Congressional Research 
Service report entitled “Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends,” it 
was noted that despite total emigration flows declining, there was evidence of “increased 
emigration by middle and upper class Mexicans, particularly from northern Mexico, in 
response to drug trafficking-related violence.”180 The report continued to cite a study 
estimating that 230,000 Mexicans had been displaced by violence as of December 2010 
and that roughly half of them had moved to the United States.181 
Another form of emigration resulting from drug violence, and hinted at in the 
displacement wording above, is fleeing unstable states for other states in Mexico. 
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Tracking this type of migration is even more difficult than international migration. 
Stories have however confirmed the expected patterns of drug-related migration within 
Mexico. A study by Parametría (public opinion research organization located in Mexico 
City) found that an estimate of 1.6 million were displaced by violence between 2005 and 
2010, with another 700,000 displaced in just the next year between 2010 and 2011.182 
While some of these are individual families leaving after clashes between drug cartels or 
between drug cartels and Mexican armed forces, others are under the direct threat of 
death. In the state of Tamaulipas, the entire village of Ciudad Mier was forced to leave in 
2010 after the feuding cartels there threatened to kill anyone that stayed.183  
 
Private Security 
In Mexico, due to a long history of corruption, dissatisfaction with the Mexican 
police and other federal and state security forces have predictably fueled a dramatic turn 
towards private security firms, especially by the Mexican elite. In public polling, the 
police rank among the lowest trusted institutions in Mexico. In a 2009 poll, only 29% of 
respondents indicated confidence in the police.184 This is heavily intertwined with a belief 
of the police as corrupt. In a 2009 study on police in Mexico, David Shirk found that 49% 
of residents in Guadalajara (where 70% consider crime and insecurity a serious issue) 
considered the police to be corrupt and 68% of those believed that the corruption 
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occurred at the highest levels.185 In general, this distrust of institutions and perception of 
mass corruption are also displayed with 68% of Mexicans reporting that corrupt leaders 
are a serious national concern.186 All of this has led to a belief that the Mexican 
government is unable to fully “protect the streets” and fueled the rise of private security 
in response to the rise in drug violence. These beliefs are only reinforced with scandal 
after scandal. As Logan Puck notes in his article commenting on the relationship between 
private security and the police in Mexico, 
Mexico must cope with police forces that are particularly infamous for their 
abusive and corrupt practices. These practices were most recently exemplified in 
September 2014 in Iguala, Guerrero, when municipal police forces detained 43 
protesting college students at a public event. The protestors disappeared as they 
were allegedly handed off by the police to local elements of organized crime, who 
murdered them. The event sparked international outrage, and nationwide protests 
rocked Mexico for weeks.187 
 
The Mexican government has attempted to address these concerns but to little 
avail. The Mexican government passed laws in the 1990s and 2000s aimed to “foster a 
positive and collaborative relationship between public and private security forces,” but 
the partnership is largely symbolic as private security firms seek to “dissociate from the 
institution’s poor reputation.”188 This low level of trust in the police was a guiding reason 
given by anti-drug trafficking mission to be largely turned over to the Mexican armed 
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forces under the Calderón administration. Unlike the police, the army gains significant 
trust among the Mexican people, with 74% expressing confidence in a 2009 poll while 
the same poll reported only 29% confidence in the police.189 Although the use of the 
army to combat drug traffickers was widely popular, with 89% supporting the decision, it 
nevertheless was not perceived as an actual solution with 65% reporting that they thought 
the army would “only solve the problem temporarily.”190 Further undermining Mexican 
confidence in government is the rising perception that the Mexican Army is losing the 
war against drug traffickers. In 2011, 59% of Mexicans reported that the country was 
worse off than in 2006 despite the Army’s anti-drug trafficking campaigns.191 Further, 
77% said that Calderon had “lost control of the situation.”192 The debacle and apparent 
failure of the Mexican Drug War led two of the three leading candidates in Mexico’s 
2012 presidential election to discuss the withdrawal of Mexico’s military from the drug 
war.193 
All of this has led to a belief that the Mexican government is unable to fully 
“protect the streets” and fueled the rise of private security in response to the rise in drug 
violence. In some cases, the situation is so extreme that private security is instructed to 
not involve the police. Alberto Herrera, who works for International Private Security 
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(Mexico-based security company) in 2014 spoke of one such case, explaining “They 
didn’t want us to call the police. People don’t necessarily trust the cops.”194 Between 
2005 and 2015, the number of security firms rose from 173 to 1,103 (a 530% increase) as 
personnel grew from 419 to 73,000 (17,000% increase).195 These official numbers are 
only among registered firms and reported staff. Estimates from the National Private 
Security Confederation show that the actual number of firms could be as high as 9,000 
and estimated that the number of security guards was between 250,000 and 600,000.196 
This means that the number of private security guards in the country could actually 
outnumber the entire Mexican police force which was estimated at 544,000 people in 
2012.197 This trend is only recently getting serious attention as commentators and security 
experts are warning of corruption and threats from such a private police force.198  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter outlined the various methods in which the Mexican Drug War and 
corresponding instability has influenced the political landscape. Despite the continued 
carnage and violence, the panel data model found intentional homicides (a proxy for drug 
violence) to have no significant impact on any type of national elections. This finding, 
however, does not say that drug violence has not influenced the political landscape. The 
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issue of security has influenced voters in separate elections but not in a systematic 
manner in favor of a certain party. The same “fear vote” helped PAN candidate Calderón 
in 2006 and then PRI candidate Peña Nieto in 2012. This chapter also outlines factors of 
Mexican politics that may be limiting the use of political parties as an avenue for these 
frustrations. 
 Although not in the model, there are a variety of other methods in which the 
Mexican Drug War has altered the political climate. Other strategies to express 
dissatisfaction have included protests, lobbying, migration, and the rise of private 
security. This chapter outlines each to find how they have shifted from 2000 through 
2012. Multiple protest movements have spread through Mexico over this time – including 
most prominently the Mexican Indignados Movement and #YaMeCansé movements 
which have demanded an end to corruption and violence. Analysis of migration patterns 
revealed that many Mexicans are choosing to leave the country – with skyrocketing 
asylum applicants to the United States. Mexicans have also moved around Mexico 
avoiding conflict as demonstrated by studies of displaced citizens. The other development 
has been the rise of private security especially among the country’s elite. These 
developments speak to the huge impact of drug violence on the Mexican voter and 
indicates an overarching destabilizing component as citizens seem to overwhelmingly be 
turning to factors outside of the state for solutions (see: private security and migration). 
The Mexican Drug War remains a topic of extensive academic interest and could benefit 
from individual election analysis complimented by future voter interviews and surveys. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The shift of elections in Mexico from authoritarian displays of legitimacy to the 
actual democratic selection of leadership has been accompanied by extensive literature on 
partisanship. This paper serves to compliment this research with further analysis on the 
influences from state expenditures and the Mexican Drug War. Using a panel data model 
and extensive research, it was shown that both factors play a role in Mexican politics. 
Specifically, state expenditures were found to have a significant relationship on 
partisanship in diputados elections with a thousand peso increase in state spending 
relating to a 0.66% boost for PRI candidates and a negative 0.78% and 1.57% 
relationship on PAN and PRD candidates respectively. This paper provides the theory 
that this relationship is most likely the result of a rise in social spending and a largely PRI 
incumbency at the state level between 2000 and 2012. With this finding, this paper 
proposes the first empirical evidence showing that state funds influence party 
preferences. This mirrors prior findings of federal social spending influencing party 
voting by boosting the incumbent party. The paper also proposes an alternative theory 
relating state spending to economic performance and higher voting for the incumbent 
state party. These findings serve as the impetus for further research in the topic with more 
advanced models or data on incumbency specifically with effects on state-level elections 
(instead of national elections used in this model). Hopefully further research can fully 
explain the continued role of social welfare spending at the state level on partisanship. 
 This paper also delves into the role of the Mexican Drug War on partisanship. 
Although contrary to initial expectations, the finding of no relationship between drug 
violence (represented with intentional homicide figures) and party voting was easily 
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explained with further analysis. The grouping of elections together in the model could be 
serving to hide the “fear vote” from drug violence that helped certain parties in certain 
elections and other parties in other elections. Additionally, a general distrust of political 
parties and ignorance on significant party platform difference regarding drug violence 
could help explain why the results showed no relationship. Under this theory, Mexicans 
would be inclined to use avenues outside of the ballot box to pursue change or voice 
dissatisfaction. Survey data in Mexico would be the best method to determine the validity 
of this theory. In line with this theory, however, this paper did explore other areas of 
political life for alternative strategies. Research reveals that the Mexican Drug War has 
played a significant role in fueling a variety of actions. First, there have been many 
protests and lobbying movements aimed directly at what are perceived as the roots of the 
Mexican Drug War. This paper specifically discussed Javier Sicilia’s Mexican 
Indignados Movement and the more recent #YaMeCansé campaign. Second, the Mexican 
Drug War has led to an increase in migration both as people are displaced by violence 
and an increasing number of Mexicans have chosen to leave the country. Third, the 
Mexican Drug War has seen the extensive rise in private security especially among the 
elite as dissatisfaction with the police is widespread. All three of these factors help 
explain the dramatic effect of the Mexican Drug War on the political environment in 
Mexico and speak to the increasing distrust in typical Mexican institutions.  
Understanding the influence of both these factors helps to explain partisanship in 
Mexico and exposes previously understudied influences in national elections. Ultimately, 
I also hypothesize from these findings that an analysis of same two these factors in state-
level elections would yield an even greater effect. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: States of Mexico199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
199 “Mexico: boundaries, states, names (white).” D-maps.com. Accessed November 20, 
2016. 
1. Aguascalientes 
2. Baja California 
3. Baja California Sur 
4. Campeche 
5. Coahuila de Zaragoza 
6. Colima 
7. Chiapas 
8. Chihuahua 
9. Ciudad de México* 
10. Durango 
11. Guanajuato 
 
*Ciudad de México is the capital of Mexico and its own independent federal district 
 
12. Guerrero 
13. Hidalgo 
14. Jalisco 
15. México 
16. Michoacán de Ocampo 
17. Morelos 
18. Nayarit 
19. Nuevo León 
20. Oaxaca 
21. Puebla 
22. Querétaro 
 
 
 
 
23. Quintana Roo 
24. San Luis Potosí 
25. Sinaloa 
26. Sonora 
27. Tabasco 
28. Tamaulipas 
29. Tlaxcala 
30. Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 
31. Yucatán 
32. Zacatecas 
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Figure 2: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2000 (Percentages)200 
Variable   Fox (PAN)   Labastida (PRI)   Cárdenas (PRD) 
Gender       
 Male (49%)  46  35  17 
 Female (51%)  43  40  15 
Age       
 Under 30 (32%)  49  32  15 
 30 - 45 (38%)  46  36  16 
 45 - 59 (20%)  39  42  17 
 60+ (11%)  33  47  18 
Education       
 None (7%)  23  55  20 
 Primary (34%)  33  48  17 
 Secondary (21%)  48  34  16 
 Prepatory (18%)  53  28  15 
 University (20%)  58  24  14 
Income (no. minimum salaries)       
 <1 (28%)  40  49  18 
 1 - 3 (28%)  43  37  17 
 3 - 5  (15%)  51  30  15 
 5 - 10 (13%)  56  28  13 
 > 10 (8%)  65  23  10 
Residence       
 Urban (80%)  50  32  15 
 Rural (20%)  26  52  20 
Region       
 North (26%)  43  46  9 
 Center-West (20%)  51  32  14 
 Mexico City area (27%)  46  27  22 
 Center (9%)  42  41  14 
  South (19%)   35   44   19 
Source: Mitofsky, Consulta 2000. N = 37,062. Responses of Don’t Know / No Answer excluded. Votes for other candidates excluded. 
Percentages are rounded and may not add up to 100%. 
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Figure 3: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2006 (Percentages)201 
Variable   Calderón (PAN)   Madrazo (PRI)   Obrador (PRD) 
Gender         
 Male (52%)  36  22  37 
 Female (48%)  38  23  32 
Age       
 18 - 29 (30%)  38  21  34 
 30 - 49 (49%)  38  21  35 
 50+ (21%)  34  26  37 
Education       
 Basic  34  29  33 
 Middle  37  21  35 
 Higher (22%)  42  14  38 
Income (monthly in pesos)       
 -2000  31  30  34 
 2000-3999  32  24  39 
 4000-6499  36  21  37 
 6500-9199  43  16  36 
 9200+  50  14  30 
Residence       
 Urban  40  20  35 
 Rural  31  28  36 
Presidential approval       
 Approved fox's performance 17  26  51 
 Did not approve  8  31  56 
Partisan supporters       
 PRI  11  74  12 
 PAN  89  4  5 
 PRD  3  3  93 
 Independents (35%)  34  10  43 
Region       
 North  43  27  24 
 Center-West  47  20  27 
 Center  34  15  44 
 South   27  29  40 
Beneficiaries of social programs      
 Oportunidades  41  26  29 
 Seguro popular  44  25  26 
View of future personal economic situation      
 Improve  60  15  20 
 Same  30  24  40 
 Worse  12  31  52 
Vote in 2000       
 Fox  57  8  29 
 Labastida  13  64  19 
 Cardenas  7  4  88 
  New voters   36   19   37 
Source: Reforma, exit poll, 5,803 voters, July 2, 2006, +/- 1.3% margin of error. 
 
 
 
                                                          
201 Taken from Camp, Roderic Ai. Politics in Mexico. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2014. Page 237. 
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Figure 4: Demographic Variables and the Presidential Vote in 2012 (Percentages)202 
Variable   Vazquez Mota (PAN)   Peña Nieto (PRI)   Obrador (PRD) 
Gender       
 Male (49%)  25  37  36 
 Female (51%)  27  41  29 
Age       
 18 - 29 (31%)  23  36  37 
 30 - 49 (44%)  27  41  30 
 50+ (25%)  28  40  30 
Education       
 Basic (49%)  24  48  26 
 Middle (21%)  28  33  37 
 Higher (30%)  29  29  39 
Income (monthly in pesos)       
 -785  24  45  28 
 786 - 1517  24  39  34 
 1518 - 3034  35  29  37 
 3035 - 4551  25  41  30 
 4552 - 7585  21  38  37 
 7586 - 15170  25  36  37 
 15171 - 20000  26  35  35 
 20000+  26  33  40 
Residence       
 Urban  26  37  34 
 Rural  26  44  29 
Presidential approval       
 Yes  37  36  25 
 No  7  44  47 
Partisan supporters       
 PRI  5  90  4 
 PAN  85  6  7 
 PRD  2  4  93 
 Independents (37%)  22  32  41 
Region       
 North  33  40  25 
 Center-West  29  44  25 
 Center  19  35  43 
 South   20  39  40 
View of future personal economic situation       
 Improve  55  26  17 
 Same  24  43  30 
 Worse  10  43  45 
The most important problem in Mexico       
 Economy  22  35  29 
 Security  23  37  25 
Vote in 2000       
 Calderón   49  29  20 
 Madrazo   6  82  10 
 Obrador   5  12  83 
  New voters   22   38   36 
Source: Reforma, exit poll, 3,096 voters, July 1, 2012, +/- 1.8% margin of error. 
                                                          
202 Taken from Camp, Roderic Ai. Politics in Mexico. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2014. Page 241. 
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Figure 5: Gross State Expenditures (Percentage Growth since Last Election)203 
State  2000 - 2003 2003 - 2006 2006 - 2009 2009 - 2012 
Total  
(2000 - 2014) 
Aguascalientes 45.2% 47.1% 40.1% 31.1% 292.3% 
Baja California -22.0% 36.9% 22.3% 28.9% 68.3% 
Baja California Sur 42.7% 52.0% 44.0% 20.3% 275.8% 
Campeche 31.8% 41.8% 18.8% 40.1% 210.8% 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 41.2% 41.3% 55.5% 3.7% 221.7% 
Colima 37.7% 43.1% 25.3% 48.4% 266.1% 
Chiapas 39.2% 45.6% 44.8% 29.5% 279.8% 
Chihuahua 53.6% 34.0% 32.8% 30.6% 256.9% 
Ciudad de México* 23.4% 35.5% 26.3% 22.0% 157.6% 
Durango 47.0% 22.4% 66.1% 4.6% 212.5% 
Guanajuato 36.9% 45.5% 55.6% 17.3% 263.6% 
Guerrero 47.7% 34.3% 26.6% 34.3% 237.2% 
Hidalgo 54.8% 29.7% 47.2% 36.6% 303.9% 
Jalisco 35.1% 47.5% 45.7% 11.0% 222.0% 
México 55.8% 60.1% 45.9% 31.4% 377.9% 
Michoacán de Ocampo 46.4% 34.0% 46.0% 19.3% 241.6% 
Morelos 43.4% 36.7% 40.9% 11.0% 206.8% 
Nayarit 35.7% 35.1% 44.7% 41.1% 274.3% 
Nuevo León 33.1% 40.1% 34.0% 49.9% 274.7% 
Oaxaca 47.6% 48.5% 59.7% 11.0% 288.8% 
Puebla 50.6% 22.6% 43.4% 27.8% 238.1% 
Querétaro 48.6% 36.5% 43.9% 16.6% 240.2% 
Quintana Roo 45.1% 59.6% 72.9% 21.0% 384.4% 
San Luis Potosí 46.6% 47.1% 27.3% 21.6% 233.8% 
Sinaloa 44.7% 49.6% 35.8% 24.8% 266.8% 
Sonora 41.7% 60.8% 43.7% 14.4% 274.8% 
Tabasco 40.4% 57.7% 15.8% 22.9% 215.1% 
Tamaulipas 38.7% 50.2% 48.8% -1.2% 206.4% 
Tlaxcala 39.6% 36.2% 56.2% 26.2% 274.7% 
Veracruz de Ignacio de 
la Llave 47.7% 37.2% 45.5% 39.9% 312.5% 
Yucatán 185.1% 47.1% 41.4% 18.8% 604.9% 
Zacatecas 46.1% 38.9% 65.8% 26.4% 325.2% 
 
 
                                                          
203 Table created using data found on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
website under “Microdatos.” The direct link is as follows: 
www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/accesomicrodatos/ 
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Model Variables 
 
ID 
Number here represents the panel data indicator of the state for that observation. The 
listing goes from 1 to 31, representing all 32 states (including federal district) but drops 
one to avoid perfect collinearity in the model. States are numbered alphabetical order 
with the federal district named “Ciudad de México.” 
 
Year 
Number here represents year of the observation. As we discussed in methodology, the 
years observed for models varies. For senate and presidential election models, the six-
year term meant that years included 2000, 2006, and 2012. For the diputados election 
model, the three-year term meant that observations included 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 
2012. 
 
Turnout (𝑦𝑖𝑡) (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) 
Measured as total number of voters as percentage of the total number of registered voters 
for that election year. All of these figures are reported by the INE.204 This figure is used 
both as an independent and dependent variable in the models. 
 
PRI (𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
Percentage of the total voting population that voted for the PRI party in that year. This 
was calculated from the INE online database.205 PRI was defined in each year as the 
political party or political alliance formed with the PRI that year. In 2006, the PRI formed 
the “Alianza por México” (Alliance for Mexico) political alliance with a smaller political 
party.206 As a result, in the calculation of percentages in 2006, the voting total for 
“Alianza por México” was used to indicate voting percentage for the PRI. In 2000, some 
voting data on PRI totals were missing on the INE online database meaning a blank for 
some years in certain states. 
 
PAN (𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
Percentage of the total voting population that voted for the PAN party in that year. This 
was calculated from the INE online database.207 PAN was defined in each year as the 
political party or political alliance formed with the PAN that year. In 2000, the PAN 
                                                          
204 Found on the Instituto Nacional Electoral website under “Histórico de Resultados 
Electorales” and under the title “Atlas de Resultados Electorales Federales 1991-2012.” 
The direct link is as follows: http://siceef.ife.org.mx/pef2012/SICEEF2012.html. 
205 Ibid. 
206 “Convenios de Coalición.” Instituto Nacional Electoral. Accessed November 20, 
2016. Do not confuse this political alliance with alliance by same name in the 2000 
elections led by the PRD. 
207 Found on the Instituto Nacional Electoral website under “Histórico de Resultados 
Electorales” and under the title “Atlas de Resultados Electorales Federales 1991-2012.” 
The direct link is as follows: http://siceef.ife.org.mx/pef2012/SICEEF2012.html. 
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formed the “Alianza por el Cambio” (Alliance for Change) political alliance with a 
smaller political party.208 As a result, in the calculation of percentages for 2000, the 
voting total for “Alianza por el Cambio” was used to indicate voting percentage for the 
PAN. 
 
PRD (𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
Percentage of the total voting population that voted for the PRD party in that year. This 
was calculated from the INE online database.209 PRD was defined in each year as the 
political party or political alliance formed with the PRD that year. In 2000, the PRD 
formed the “Alianza por México” (Alliance for Mexico) political alliance with multiple 
smaller parties.210 As a result, in the calculation of percentages for 2000, the voting total 
for “Alianza por México” was used to indicate voting percentage for the PRD. In 2006, 
the PRD formed the “Coalición por el Bien de Todos” (Coalition for the Good of All) 
political alliance with multiple smaller parties.211 As a result, in the calculation of 
percentages for 2006, the voting total for “Coalición por el Bien de Todos” was used to 
indicate voting percentage for the PRD. 
 
President (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) 
In the model for representative (“diputados”) elections, there is an additional covariate 
named “President” that is an indicator of whether that year is a presidential election year. 
Years 2000, 2006, and 2012 are marked with a 1. 
 
Homicides (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) 
Number here is the number of intentional homicides reported by the INEGI for the year 
of the election.212 Intentional homicides were chosen to indicate drug violence per state 
for two primary reasons: (1) it is collected and well reported by INEGI going back to 
1990 and (2) closely mirrors drug violence. In fact, intentional homicides mirror drug 
violence so closely that they are commonly used in research on Mexican drug violence. 
                                                          
208 “Convenios de Coalición.” Instituto Nacional Electoral. Accessed November 20, 
2016. 
209 Found on the Instituto Nacional Electoral website under “Histórico de Resultados 
Electorales” and under the title “Atlas de Resultados Electorales Federales 1991-2012.” 
The direct link is as follows: http://siceef.ife.org.mx/pef2012/SICEEF2012.html. 
210 “Convenios de Coalición.” Instituto Nacional Electoral. Accessed November 20, 
2016. Do not confuse this political alliance with alliance by same name in the 2006 
elections led by the PRI.  
211 Ibid. 
212 Found on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía website under 
“Microdatos.” The direct link is as follows: 
www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/accesomicrodatos/ 
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Examples include the “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016” 
report published in April 2016 by the Justice in Mexico Project.213  
 
Homicides2 (𝑥𝑖−1
′ ) 
Number here is the number of intentional homicides reported by the INEGI for the year 
before the election.214 Since elections in Mexico are held on the first Sunday of July in 
election years215, the number of homicides in the previous year is equally as important to 
the mentality of the population that may influence their voting preference. The inability 
to extract exact date from the intentional homicide data meant that running regressions 
with both Homicides and Homicides2 would be the most comprehensive way to analyze 
the impact of drug violence on party preference. 
 
Spending (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) 
Number here represents the gross state expenditures per person in the year of the eleciton, 
shown in thousands of pesos. This value was calculated using state gross expenditures 
reported by the INEGI216 and population totals by state from the Mexico Population and 
Housing Census.217 Since the census in Mexico is only conducted every five years, the 
gaps in population data were filled assuming linear growth. 
 
PopGrowth (𝑥𝑖−1
′ ) 
Percentage here shows the growth in the population between the last election and the year 
before the current election. For example, population growth for the presidential election 
in 2000 would be the growth in the population between 1994 and 1999. Total population 
figure by state are from the Mexico Population and Housing Census.218 Since the census 
in Mexico is only conducted every five years, the gaps in population data were filled 
assuming linear growth.  
 
 
                                                          
213  Heinle, Kimberly, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk. “Drug Violence 
in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2015.” Justice in Mexico Project. University of 
San Diego, April 2016. 
214 Found on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía website under 
“Microdatos.” The direct link is as follows: 
www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/accesomicrodatos/ 
215 Martinez, Carla. “Mexico’s Electoral Process.” V.I.P. Article: Rice University. 
Accessed November 20, 2016. 
216 Found on the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía website under 
“Microdatos.” The direct link is as follows: 
www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/accesomicrodatos/ 
217 “Censos y Conteos de Población y Vivienda.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía. Accessed October 20, 2016 for the 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 census. For 
the 2015 census: “Censo de Población y Vivienda 2015.” Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía. Accessed November 20, 2016. 
218 Ibid. 
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Male (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ) 
Percentage here shows the proportion of the population of the state that identifies as 
male. Gender and total population breakdown were both provided in the Mexico 
Population and Housing Census.219 Since the census in Mexico is only conducted every 
five years, the gaps in population data were filled assuming linear growth. The 
percentage of the population that identifies as female was excluded from the model to 
avoid perfect collinearity issues but is still represented with the percentage of the 
population not falling into the male covariates.  
 
N1, N2… (𝜂𝑡) 
These covariates represent the time fixed effects in the model. These are included to 
capture all time effects on voting preference that are not controlled for elsewhere in the 
model. These help capture time trends by only comparing values for a year across states. 
In the model, for Presidential and Senate elections, N1=2000, N2=2006, and N3=2012. In 
representative (“diputados”) elections, as expected, N1=2000, N2=2003, N3=2006, 
N4=2009, and N5=2012. To avoid perfect collinearity issues, the last covariate is omitted 
from the model. 
 
 
A1, A2, …, A31 (𝛼𝑡) 
These covariates represent the individual state fixed effects in the model. These are 
included to capture all state effects on voting preference that are not controlled for 
elsewhere in the model. These help capture state trends by comparing values for only a 
certain state across many years. In the model, the states are designated alphabetically 
with A1=Aguascalientes and A32=Zacatecas. To avoid perfect collinearity issues, the last 
covariate is omitted from the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
219 Ibid. 
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